[1]徐勇戈,王若曦.IPD模式下努力因素对利益分配机制的影响[J].西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版),2018,50(04):602-608.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2018.04.021]
　XU Yongge,WANG Ruoxi.Efforts to influence the distribution of interests in IPD[J].J. Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech.(Natural Science Edition),2018,50(04):602-608.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2018.04.021]
点击复制

IPD模式下努力因素对利益分配机制的影响()
分享到：

西安建筑科技大学学报（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-7930/CN:61-1295/TU]

卷:
50
期数:
2018年04期
页码:
602-608
栏目:
出版日期:
2018-08-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Efforts to influence the distribution of interests in IPD
文章编号:
1006-7930(2018)04-0602-07
作者:
徐勇戈; 王若曦
(西安建筑科技大学 管理学院,陕西 西安710055)
Author(s):
XU Yongge;  WANG Ruoxi
(School of ManagementXi’an Univ. of Arch.Tech Xi ’an 710055China)
关键词:
IPD模式; 努力系数; 利益分配; Shapley值法
Keywords:
IPD mode ; degree of effort;  distribution of interests;  Shapley
分类号:
TU-9
DOI:
10.15986/j.1006-7930.2018.04.021
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
Integrated Project Delivery（简称IPD）即项目集成交付模式，是一种新型的交付模式，核心是利益分配机制.目前，中国对IPD模式利益分配机制的研究忽略了建设过程中项目各方努力程度与项目成功的关联，并在利益分配中忽视了努力行为，促使项目各方忽视努力成本的投入而确保自身收益，导致项目工程变更增加、风险提升、项目失败.为改善此现象，通过对项目各方努力行为的研究，列举出十六项工程建设中的努力行为，依此建立努力系数.结合重要系数、风险系数等建立新的Shapley法的利益分配模型，通过算例分析研究表明：该模型有助于各参与方积极进行项目建设，从而提升各参与方的收益
Abstract:
Integrated Project Delivery(IPD) is a new kind of delivery mode. IPD model is the core of interest distribution mechanism. The IPD mode of interests distribution mechanism separates relation of participants in the process of the construction effort and success of the project. Based on the research of the participants, 16 items of the behavior of efforts in the construction of engineering are enumerated and effort coefficient by combining the important coefficient, and risk coefficient a new profit distribution model of Shapley method is set up. Through example analysis, the model can help the parties actively for project construction and the promotion of the benefits of the parties.

参考文献/References:

References

[1]The Associated General Contractors of America (AGC）．Integrated project delivery for public and private owners[EB/OL]．[2017-08-22].http://www.wbdg.org/projectmanagement/project-delivery-teams.

[2]KENT D C, BECERIKGERBER B. Understanding construction industry experience and attitudes toward integrated project delivery[J]. Journal of Construction Engineering & Management, 2010, 136(8):815-825. .

[3]张连营,汪炼念,谷李忠.IPD项目参与方合作关系质量演化[J].土木工程与管理学报,2015,32(4):1-7.

ZHANG Lianying，WANG Liannian，GU Lizhong. Revolution in collaboration relationship quality among project parties in IPD[J].Journal of Civil Engineering and Management,2015,32(04):1-7.

[4]杨艳平,罗福周,王博俊，等.工程分包模式下质量优化收益共享群体激励演化研究[J].西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版),2017,49(5):740-746.

YANG Yanping，LUO Fuzhou，WANG Bojun,et al. Research on the evolution of the quality optimization revenue sharing group incentive under the engineering subcontract mode[J].Journal of Xi’an Univ of Arch & Tech (Natural Science Edition),2017,49(5):740-746.

[5]郭玉莹,苏振民.IPD模式下基于Kan-BIM的项目信息协同管理研究[J].施工技术,2016,45(18):58-62.

GUO Yuying，SU Zhenmin. Research on information synergy management based on Kan-BIM in the mode of integrated project deliver[J]. Construction Technology, 2016,45(18):58-62.

[6] AIA NATIONAL, AIA CALIFORNIA COUNCIL. Integrated project delivery: a guide[EB/OL]. [2016-06-15]. http://www.aia.org/contractdocs/AIAS077630#ipdguide.

[7]张连营,王煜.情商视角下IPD项目知识共享对合作绩效的影响研究[J].项目管理技术,2016,14(7):11-16.

ZHANG Lianying, WANG Yu. Research on the impact of IPD project knowledge sharing on cooperative performance under the perspective of emotional intelligence[J]Project Management Technology,2016,14(7):11-16.

[8]李旻,李骁,基于合作博弈理论的IPD项目利润分配研究[J].生产力研究,2016(1):8-13，39.

LI Min, LI Xiao. Research on profit distribution of IPD project based on cooperative game theory[J]. Productivity Research,2016(01):8-13，39.

[9]马智亮,马健坤.消除建筑工程设计变更的定量激励机制[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2016,44(8):1280-1285.

MA Zhiliang, MA Jiankun. To eliminate the quantitative incentive mechanism of architectural engineering design change[J].Journal of Tongji University(Natural Science),2016,44(8):1280-1285.

[10] 王茹,王柳舒.基于IMOCS算法的IPD团队激励池动态分配问题研究[J].计算机工程与应用,2018,54(8):247-254.

WANG Ru, WANG Liushu. Study on dynamic allocation of IPD team incentive pool based on IMOCS algorithm[J].Computer Engineering and Applications,2018,54(8):247-254.

[11] 浦培根,吕文学.工程项目突发事件知识联盟利益分配研究[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(4):562-570.

PU Peigen, L Wenxue. Study on the interest distribution of the knowledge alliance of emergent events in engineering projects[J]Journal of Systems Engineering,2013,28(4):562-570.

[12] 陈哲,陈国宏.考虑公平参照点差异的建设项目绿色合作努力行为决策[J].控制与决策,2018,33(6):1107-1116.

CHEN Zhe, CHEN Guohong. Consider fair reference point difference construction project green cooperative effort behavior decision [J]Control and Decision,2018,33(06):1107-1116.

[13] ZHANG L, LI F. Risk/reward compensation model for integrated project delivery[J]. Engineering Economics, 2014, 25(5).558-567.

[14] 王德东,李凯丽,基于IPD模式的项目参与方利益分配研究[J].项目管理技术,2016,14(10):44-49.

WANG Dedong LI Kaili. Research on the benefit distribution of project participants based on IPD mode[J]. Project Management Technology,2016,14(10):44-49.

[15]丁继勇,王卓甫.建设工程项目交付方式与项目绩效研究综述[J].土木工程学报,2014,47(4):131-144.

DING Jiyong WANG Zhuopu. A review of project delivery methods and project performance[J]China Civil Engineering Journal,2014,47(4):131-144.

[16]李成华,李慧民,基于模糊层次分析法的建筑安全管理绩效评价研究[J].西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版),2009,41(2):207-212.

相似文献/References:

[1]刘华,李冠杰,辛晓卫.IPD模式下建设工程项目激励池分配研究[J].西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版),2018,50(06):913.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2018.06.023]
　LIU Hua,LI Guanjie,XIN Xiaowei.Research on incentive pool allocation in construction project under IPD mode[J].J. Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech.(Natural Science Edition),2018,50(04):913.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2018.06.023]

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:

收稿日期:2017-12-05修改稿日期:2018-07-05
基金项目:陕西省教育厅高校重点研究基地项目（13J028）
第一作者:徐勇戈（1969-），男，教授，硕士生导师，主要从事工程经济与管理等领域的教学与科研工作． E-mail ：996276734@qq.com?
通讯作者:王若曦（1993-），男，硕士生，主要研究领域工程项目管理． E-mail ：342937075@qq.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2018-09-11