[1]李红波,赖应良,刘亚丽.建设监理多任务委托代理模型[J].西安建筑科技大学学报:自然科学版,2011,43(05):660-664.[doi:DOI :10.15986/j .1006-7930.2011.05.001]
　LI Hong-bo,LA I Ying-liang,LIU Y a-l i.Multi-task principal-agent relationships model forconstruction supervision[J].J.Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech.:Natural Science Edition,2011,43(05):660-664.[doi:DOI :10.15986/j .1006-7930.2011.05.001]
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建设监理多任务委托代理模型()
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西安建筑科技大学学报:自然科学版[ISSN:1006-7930/CN:61-1295/TU]

卷:
43
期数:
2011年05期
页码:
660-664
栏目:
出版日期:
2011-10-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Multi-task principal-agent relationships model for
construction supervision
文章编号:
1006-7930(2011)05-0660-05
作者:
李红波;  赖应良;  刘亚丽
(昆明理工大学建筑工程学院, 云南昆明650500)
Author(s):
LI Hong-bo ;  LA I Ying-liang ;  LIU Y a-l i
(Kunming Univ .of Sci.& Tech , Kunming 650500 , China)
关键词:
建设监理; 多任务委托代理; 激励机制设计
Keywords:
construct supervision ; multi-task p rincipal-agent ; incentive mechanism design .
分类号:
TU201
DOI:
DOI :10.15986/j .1006-7930.2011.05.001
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
建设监理合同决定了业主与监理方之间的委托— 代理关系.建设监理利用信息优势隐匿真实的努力
水平, 存在损害业主利益的“ 道德风险” .为实现监理任务多个控制目标之间的协调均衡实现, 借助多任务委托
代理最优合同模型, 分析了监理任务被观测的难易程度、建设监理努力边际成本的关联性和风险规避度对激
励强度的影响, 进而制定了激励组合策略:①业主在对工程监理实施客观绩效评价, 同时引进主观绩效评价;
②根据监理人的特质选择监理工程师;③监理合同期划分为若干观测期, 监理过程引入竞争机制;④将多任务
间努力成本的替代性转化为互补性.
Abstract:
The pro prieto r and supervisor s establish principa l-agent relatio nships by constructio n superv isio n contract .Co nstr
uction supervisor o bscures the effo rt adv antag e in info rmatio n, and may bring abo ut mo ral hazar d damag es to the interests
of principal .In o rder to coo rdinate and improve multi-objectiv e supe rvision tasks , by multi-task principal-agent optimal
contract model, the paper indicated tha t the o bser vable co ntributio ns and ma rginal co st of super viso rs’ effo rts and
their coefficient o f risk ave rsion may affect incentive intensity .The ince ntive str ategie s po rtfo lio are as following :① to
assess bo th the o bjective and subjective per forma nce o f supervisor s’ effo rt , ② to select superv iso rs by characteristics, ③
to ado pt co nstr uctio n co ntr act periods and introduce competitio n mechanism s in process o f supervision , ④ to translate alte
rna tion of multi-task effo r t co st into its complementatio n.

参考文献/References:

References
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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
＊收稿日期:2010-10-18 　　修改稿日期:2011-07-14
基金项目:云南省自然科学基金资助项目(2008ZC029M)
作者简介:李红波(1973-), 男,湖北应城人, 博士后, 副教授, 主要从事建筑工程管理方面的研究.
更新日期/Last Update: 2015-11-05