西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版)

既有民用建筑节能改造的外部性引起市场配置失灵,阻碍了EPC模式在我国的推广应用.为此,文章系统分析了节能改造外部性机理并定量计算外部性的大小,指出政府利用经济激励促进节能改造的可行性; 并构建了政府对EPC合同主体激励的演化博弈模型,通过模型参数建立相应的复制动态方程,解析得到各主体策略选择的稳态点.结果表明,业主和ESCO选择进行节能改造的比例随预期收益及政府的激励力度提高而提高,但要满足激励公平原则; 政府立足于可持续发展及社会收益最大化的视角,适当加大激励力度,可以激发EPC合同主体节能改造的积极性,有利于EPC模式的市场培育.

The externalities of existing energy-saving renovation of civil buildings cause the failure of market allocation and hinder the popularization and application of EPC model in China. For this reason, the externality mechanism of energy conservation reform is analyzed systematically and the size of externality is calculated, which proves the feasibility of government using economic incentives to promote energy conservation reform. On this basis, an evolutionary game model of the government's incentive to the EPC contract subject is constructed, and the replication dynamic equation is established for the strategy selection of each subject obtained through analysis. Results show that the proportion of owners and ESCO choosing to carry out energy saving transformation increases with the expected return and the government's incentive strength, but the incentive fairness principle should be satisfied. Based on the perspective of sustainable development and maximization of social benefits, the government should increase the incentives appropriately, which can stimulate the enthusiasm of the EPC contract subject in energy conservation reform and is conducive to the market cultivation of the EPC mode.

引言
1 既有民用建筑节能改造外部性分析
2 EPC主体演化博弈激励机制设计
3 实证分析
4 结论

图1 有民用建筑节能改造外部性机理<br/>Fig.1 The externality mechanism of existing civil building energy conservation renovation

图1 有民用建筑节能改造外部性机理
Fig.1 The externality mechanism of existing civil building energy conservation renovation

表1 政府与合同主体的博弈支付矩阵<br/>Tab.1 The game payment matrix between government and the subject of contract

表1 政府与合同主体的博弈支付矩阵
Tab.1 The game payment matrix between government and the subject of contract

图2 业主的演化博弈复制动态相位图<br/>Fig.2 The owner's evolutionary game duplicates the dynamic phase diagram

图2 业主的演化博弈复制动态相位图
Fig.2 The owner's evolutionary game duplicates the dynamic phase diagram

图3 ESCO的演化博弈复制动态相位图<br/>Fig.3 The ESCO's evolutionary game duplication the dynamic phase diagram

图3 ESCO的演化博弈复制动态相位图
Fig.3 The ESCO's evolutionary game duplication the dynamic phase diagram

图4 政府的演化博弈复制动态相位图<br/>Fig.4 The government's evolutionary game duplication of the dynamic phase diagram

图4 政府的演化博弈复制动态相位图
Fig.4 The government's evolutionary game duplication of the dynamic phase diagram

图5 政府、业主及ESCO的复制动态关系和稳定趋势<br/>Fig.5 Dynamic relationship and stable trend of replication between government owners and ESCO

图5 政府、业主及ESCO的复制动态关系和稳定趋势
Fig.5 Dynamic relationship and stable trend of replication between government owners and ESCO

表2 酒店节能改造各方预估费用(单位:万元)<br/>Tab.2 Estimated cost of energy saving renovation of hotel

表2 酒店节能改造各方预估费用(单位:万元)
Tab.2 Estimated cost of energy saving renovation of hotel

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备注

引言

1 既有民用建筑节能改造外部性分析

2 EPC主体演化博弈激励机制设计

3 实证分析

4 结论

期刊信息