[1]梅世强,位豪强.家族上市企业管理者过度自信与企业过度投资的实证研究[J].西安建筑科技大学学报:自然科学版,2013,45(01):98-104.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2013.01.015]
　MEI Shi-qiang,WEI Hao-qiang.Empirical research on the relationship between managerial overconfidence of the listed family enterprises and excessive in nvestment[J].J.Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech.:Natural Science Edition,2013,45(01):98-104.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2013.01.015]
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家族上市企业管理者过度自信与企业过度投资的实证研究()
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西安建筑科技大学学报:自然科学版[ISSN:1006-7930/CN:61-1295/TU]

卷:
45
期数:
2013年01期
页码:
98-104
栏目:
出版日期:
2013-02-28

文章信息/Info

Title:
Empirical research on the relationship between managerial overconfidence of the listed family enterprises and excessive in nvestment
文章编号:
1006-7930(2013)01-0098-07
作者:
梅世强; 位豪强
(天津大学管理与经济学部,天津 300072)
Author(s):
MEI Shi-qiang;  WEI Hao-qiang
(School of Management and Economics of Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072,China)
关键词:
家族上市企业; 过度自信; 过度投资
Keywords:
listed family enterprises;  overconfidence;  excessive investment
分类号:
F272
DOI:
10.15986/j.1006-7930.2013.01.015
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
我国家族企业在公司治理和投资活动等方面有其独特特征,以深沪两市2008—2010年的A股上市公司为研究对象,并将其分为家族和非家族上市公司两组,通过对比分析来研究管理者过度自信对企业过度投资行为的影响.研究结果表明:(1)管理者过度自信与企业过度投资显著正相关.(2)家族上市公司的管理者比非家族上市公司的管理者更容易过度自信,且更易于做出过度投资决策.(3)独立董事比例与过度投资的关系不显著,独立董事未能发挥有效监督作用.(4)对于家族上市公司,董事长与总经理两职合一和过度投资显著正相关,但在非家族上市公司中,这种关系并不显著.(5)总资产增长率与过度投资显著正相关,资产负债率与过度投资显著负相关
Abstract:
China’s family enterprises have their unique characteristics in corporate governance and investment activities. This paper, through analyzing managerial overconfidence and the result of company overinvestment in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock market, and sorting the samples in two different groups—listed family companies and non listed family companies, comes into conclusion that,(1)Managerial overconfidence and excessive investment have a significant positive correlation. (2)Managers of listed family companies are easier to be overconfident than managers of non-listed family companies, and are easier to make over-investment decisions.(3)The relationship of the proportion of independent directors and excessive investment is not clear, which means independent directors are not playing an effective supervisory role.(4)For listed family company which has the same person as both the board director and manger, the correlation with overinvestment is pretty strong. However the relationship is not significant in non-listed family companies.(5)The growth rate of total assets has a significant positive correlation with excessive investment, and the asset-liability ratio has a significant negative correlation with the excessive investment

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2012-08-08 修改稿日期:2013-01-03
作者简介:梅世强(1967-),男,河南信阳人,副教授,硕士生导师.主要从事工程项目成本管理与项目融资方面研究.
更新日期/Last Update: 2015-10-05