[1]杨艳平,罗福周,王博俊,等.工程分包模式下质量优化收益共享群体激励演化研究[J].西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版),2017,49(05):740-0746.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2017.05.019]
　YANG Yanping,LUO Fuzhou,WANG Bojun,et al.The research on the evolution of the quality optimization revenue sharing group incentive under the Engineering Subcontract mode[J].J. Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech.(Natural Science Edition),2017,49(05):740-0746.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2017.05.019]
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工程分包模式下质量优化收益共享群体激励演化研究()
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西安建筑科技大学学报（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-7930/CN:61-1295/TU]

卷:
49
期数:
2017年05期
页码:
740-0746
栏目:
出版日期:
2017-10-28

文章信息/Info

Title:
The research on the evolution of the quality optimization revenue sharing group incentive under the Engineering Subcontract mode
文章编号:
1006-7930(2017)05-0740-08
作者:
杨艳平1; 罗福周1; 王博俊1; 2; 王腊银1
(1.西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西 西安 710055 ;2.江苏科技大学张家港校区,江苏 苏州 215600 )
Author(s):
YANG Yanping1;  LUO Fuzhou1;  WANG Bojun1; 2;  WANG Layin1
(1.School of Management, Xian University of Architecture Technology, Xian 710055, China 2.?College?of?Zhangjiagang,?Jangsu?University?of?Science?and?Technology,?Suzhou?215600China )
关键词:
公平偏好; 质量优化; 收益共享; 激励向量
Keywords:
fairness preference;  quality optimization;  revenue sharing;  excitation vector
分类号:
F294
DOI:
10.15986/j.1006-7930.2017.05.019
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
针对多标段、多专业分包商平行施工情况下总承包商与分包商的一对多结构，在各主体具有公平偏好情境下，总承包商如何利用收益共享合同对分包商群体进行激励，以实现质量优化和系统增值；为此，文章运用公平关切理论构建了群体激励模型，利用计算实验方法进行仿真。结果发现，提高收益共享系数有助于优化工程质量和增加系统收益；对不同质量等级匹配合适的激励力度可以达到良好的激励效果；受公平心理影响，激励效果在后续阶段演化中呈现震荡衰弱走势，激励力度级差过大会对激励效果产生不利影响；分包商通过调整努力程度可以对总承包商实施反激励，以激发其维持较高激励力度。
Abstract:
In view of the one to many structure of general contractor and subcontractor in the case of the multi section and multi-specialty subcontractors parallel construction, under the condition of all subjects have fair preference, how the general contractor encourages subcontractors by the revenue sharing contract, in order to achieve quality optimization and system value added. So, we construct a group incentive model based on revenue sharing coefficient and incentive vector, analysis of the incentive effect of the model in a variety of situations through the social computing method. Research findings, improving the benefit sharing coefficient is helpful to the optimization of the project quality and the increase of the system income; good incentive effect can be achieved by matching the appropriate incentives with different quality grades; be influenced by fair psychology, incentive effect show shock weakening trend in the subsequent evolution stage, that the incentive intensity differential is too large have an adverse effect on the incentive effect; the subcontractor may carry out a counter incentive to the general contractor by adjusting the degree of effort, to stimulate the general contractor to maintain a higher incentive degree

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2016-12-21修改稿日期:2017-08-21
基金项目:陕西省软科学基金项目（2017KRM158）；陕西省教育厅重点基地项目(15JZ035）
第一作者:杨艳平（1975-），女，博士生，研究方向为工程经济与管理.E-mail: wylj0704@163.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2017-11-10