[1]刘华,李冠杰,辛晓卫.IPD模式下建设工程项目激励池分配研究[J].西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版),2018,50(06):913-918.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2018.06.023]
　LIU Hua,LI Guanjie,XIN Xiaowei.Research on incentive pool allocation in construction project under IPD mode[J].J. Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech.(Natural Science Edition),2018,50(06):913-918.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2018.06.023]
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IPD模式下建设工程项目激励池分配研究()
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西安建筑科技大学学报（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-7930/CN:61-1295/TU]

卷:
50
期数:
2018年06期
页码:
913-918
栏目:
出版日期:
2018-12-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Research on incentive pool allocation in construction project under IPD mode
文章编号:
1006-7930(2018)06-0913-06
作者:
刘华; 李冠杰; 辛晓卫
西安建筑科技大学 管理学院，陕西 西安 710055
Author(s):
LIU Hua;  LI Guanjie;  XIN Xiaowei
School of Management，Xi′an Univ. of Arch. & Tech., Xi′an 710055, China
关键词:
IPD模式; 利润分配; 激励池; 多权重Shapley值法; 全因素法
Keywords:
IPD model;  profit distribution;  incentive pool;  multi-weight shapley value; total factor method
分类号:
TU722
DOI:
10.15986/j.1006-7930.2018.06.023
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
为解决IPD模式现有利润分配方式易导致盈余目标成本分配不公平的现象.针对IPD模式激励池分配问题，在分析了激励池分配与利润分配区别的基础上总结了激励池分配基本原则；利用全因素法设计了考虑企业特质、实际贡献、努力程度、风险及动态因素的参与者权重综合评价指标体系，并创造性利用评价指标体系改进多权重Shapley法，构建出综合考虑参与者边际贡献与实际付出的激励池分配模型，有效解决了经典Shapley值法仅考虑参与者边际贡献而导致搭便车的弊端；最后通过实例验证了模型的有效性，使IPD模式利润分配兼具公平性与柔性.
Abstract:
In order to solve the problem that the existing profit distribution mode could easily lead to unfair distribution of earnings target cost, the essential difference between incentive pool distribution and profit distribution is analyzed and a comprehensive evaluation index system is designed considering the characteristics of enterprise, the actual contribution, the degree of effort, the risk and the dynamic factors by full-factor method, and based on that, multi-weight Shapley value method is improved to construct a mode of incentive pool allocation considering the marginal contribution and actual contribution of the participants. Finally, an example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the model, which makes the profit distribution of IPD model fair and flexible.

参考文献/References:

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　XU Yongge,WANG Ruoxi.Efforts to influence the distribution of interests in IPD[J].J. Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech.(Natural Science Edition),2018,50(06):602.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2018.04.021]

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2017-05-12修改稿日期:2018-07-25
第一作者:刘华(1965-)，女，教授，硕士生导师，主要研究合同管理.E-mail: 310432422@qq.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2019-02-16