[1]张 波,周恩毅.房地产市场中中央与地方政府的博弈关系分析[J].西安建筑科技大学学报:自然科学版,2015,47(03):442-447.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2015.03.025]
　ZHANG Bo,ZHOU Enyi.Analysis on the game of the central government and the local government in the real estate market[J].J.Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech.:Natural Science Edition,2015,47(03):442-447.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2015.03.025]
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房地产市场中中央与地方政府的博弈关系分析()
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西安建筑科技大学学报:自然科学版[ISSN:1006-7930/CN:61-1295/TU]

卷:
47
期数:
2015年03期
页码:
442-447
栏目:
出版日期:
2015-06-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Analysis on the game of the central government and the local government in the real estate market
文章编号:
1006-7930(2015)03-0442-06
作者:
张 波1; 2; 周恩毅1
( 1. 西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西 西安 710055;2. 榆林学院管理学院,陕西 榆林 719000 )
Author(s):
ZHANG Bo 1; 2;  ZHOU Enyi 1
( 1. School of Management, Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech., Xi’an 710055, China; 2. School of Management, Yulin University, Yulin 719000, China )
关键词:
房地产市场;  中央政府; 地方政府;  博弈
Keywords:
the real estate market;  the central government;  the local government; game
分类号:
C931
DOI:
10.15986/j.1006-7930.2015.03.025
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
房地产市场调控集中了社会各利益主体之间的博弈关系，而中央与地方政府的博弈是其主体博弈的核心．由于中央与地方政府的利益选择存在差异，导致二者在房地产调控中的博弈色彩愈演愈浓．本文以中央与地方政府在房产调控中的利益博弈为主线，以现代博弈理论为工具，阐述了二者在房地产“膨胀”期和“低迷”期的利益统一性和对立性关系，分析了中央与地方政府在调控中的策略选择，最后从本质上挖掘出调控中出现各种偏差的深层原因，并相应提出构建中央与地方政府规范化合作关系的策略选择．
Abstract:
The real estate market regulation including various maximum interests, and game between central government and local government is the core of the real estate market. Due to the different interest selection, the rivalries between the central government and local government are becoming obvious in real estate regulation. The paper, taking the game between central government and local governments in the real estate regulation as the main line, analysed the strategies of central government and local governments on regulation making under the modern game theory, discusses the interests of the unity and opposites between central government and local governments in the real estate "inflation" and "weak" stage, then finds out the deep reasons of the deviation from the essence in regulation, and puts forward corresponding suggestions for the cooperation of the central government and local governments.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期：2015-02-09   修改稿日期：2015-05-25
作者简介：张波(1980-)，女，博士研究生，研究方向为资源系统优化与管理．E-mail: 182182165@qq.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2015-09-01