[1]杨艳平,刘晓君,王博俊,等.既有民用建筑节能改造EPC主体激励演化博弈分析[J].西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版),2019,51(05):763-770.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2019.10.023]
　YANG Yanping,LIU Xiaojun,WANG Bojun,et al.Game analysis by EPC stimulation evolution on energy constrvation of existing civil buildings[J].J. Xi’an Univ. of Arch. & Tech.(Natural Science Edition),2019,51(05):763-770.[doi:10.15986/j.1006-7930.2019.10.023]
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既有民用建筑节能改造EPC主体激励演化博弈分析()
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西安建筑科技大学学报（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-7930/CN:61-1295/TU]

卷:
51
期数:
2019年05期
页码:
763-770
栏目:
出版日期:
2019-12-05

文章信息/Info

Title:
Game analysis by EPC stimulation evolution on energy constrvation of existing civil buildings
文章编号:
1006-7930(2019)05-0763-08
作者:
杨艳平1; 3; 刘晓君3; 王博俊 2; 3; 刘晓丹3; 胡 伟3; 4
(1.江苏科技大学 土木工程与建筑学院,江苏 镇江 212005; 2.江苏科技大学张家港校区 船建学院,江苏 苏州 215600; 3.西安建筑科技大学 管理学院,陕西 西安 710055; 4.伊利诺伊州立大学应用科学与技术学院,伊利诺伊州布卢明顿 61790)
Author(s):
YANG Yanping1; 3; LIU Xiaojun3; WANG Bojun2; 3; LIU Xiaodan 3 ; HU Wei3; 4
(1.School of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,Jiangsu Zhenjiang 212005, China; 2.College ofZhangjiagang, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Jiangsu Suzhou 215600,China; 3.School of Management, Xi’an Univ. of Arch. Tech., Xi’an 710055, China; 4. College of Applied Science and Technology, Illinois State University, Bloomington-Normal, 61790, USA. )
关键词:
既有民用建筑;  节能改造;  EPC主体激励;  演化博弈
Keywords:
existing civil buildings;  energy efficiency renovations;  EPC subjects’ incentive;  evolutionary game
分类号:
TU111.19+5.9, F294
DOI:
10.15986/j.1006-7930.2019.10.023
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
既有民用建筑节能改造的外部性引起市场配置失灵,阻碍了EPC模式在我国的推广应用.为此,文章系统分析了节能改造外部性机理并定量计算外部性的大小,指出政府利用经济激励促进节能改造的可行性; 并构建了政府对EPC合同主体激励的演化博弈模型,通过模型参数建立相应的复制动态方程,解析得到各主体策略选择的稳态点.结果表明,业主和ESCO选择进行节能改造的比例随预期收益及政府的激励力度提高而提高,但要满足激励公平原则; 政府立足于可持续发展及社会收益最大化的视角,适当加大激励力度,可以激发EPC合同主体节能改造的积极性,有利于EPC模式的市场培育.
Abstract:
The externalities of existing energy-saving renovation of civil buildings cause the failure of market allocation and hinder the popularization and application of EPC model in China. For this reason, the externality mechanism of energy conservation reform is analyzed systematically and the size of externality is calculated, which proves the feasibility of government using economic incentives to promote energy conservation reform. On this basis, an evolutionary game model of the government’s incentive to the EPC contract subject is constructed, and the replication dynamic equation is established for the strategy selection of each subject obtained through analysis. Results show that the proportion of owners and ESCO choosing to carry out energy saving transformation increases with the expected return and the government’s incentive strength, but the incentive fairness principle should be satisfied. Based on the perspective of sustainable development and maximization of social benefits, the government should increase the incentives appropriately, which can stimulate the enthusiasm of the EPC contract subject in energy conservation reform and is conducive to the market cultivation of the EPC mode.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2018-11-07 修改稿日期:2019-06-10基金项目:陕西省重点研发计划基金项目(2018ZDCXL-SF-03-04),住建部软科学研究基金资助项目(2015R1010)第一作者:杨艳平(1975-),女,博士,经济师,研究方向为工程经济与管理.E-mail: yangyp@just.edu.cn通讯作者:王博俊(1969-),男,博士,副教授,研究方向为工程经济与管理.E-mail:wbj7266996@163.com.
更新日期/Last Update: 2019-12-05